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Introduction 
 
One summer afternoon in Havana, I sat talking to a group of Cuban economists.  They 
were explaining to me the rather intricate workings of the Cuban economy.  After laying 
out the four different ―markets‖ that operated simultaneously, one of the economists 
noticed my somewhat dazed look.  Laughing, he said he understood my confusion.  ―It‘s 
hard for us too,‖ he said.  ―There is no model.‖ 
 
Later that evening I began to consider the implication of Cuba operating without an 
economic model.  What purpose does an economic model serve?  Could Cuba really not 
have an economic model?  What fills the vacuum created by its absence?  What are the 
implications for future economic decisions in such a ―model free‖ environment?  This 
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paper seeks to address some of the questions generated by my economist friend‘s 
comment. 
 
What role do economic models play for governments?  Typically, one would expect a 
model to suggest appropriate policy for governments to enact.  It is a guideline, a rubric 
to which policymakers turn when attempting to achieve specific economic goals.  
Differences between economic models stem from their differing assumptions, theories of 
economic behavior, and policy prescriptions.  Of course, no state perfectly follows any 
single economic model.  However, states are usually associated with a specific model.  
And, economic policy is normally presented within the framework of the dominant 
model.  Model exceptions usually have to be justified. 
 
The ―problem‖ posed by the absence of an economic model depends upon your 
perspective.  For economic actors attempting to predict future state behavior, the absence 
of a model results in greater uncertainty; there is no paradigm that can be used to generate 
likely scenarios of government behavior.  For decision-makers, the absence of a model 
also signifies greater uncertainty.  Upon what are decisions based, if there is no model?  
In theory, this suggests that decision-makers have greater autonomy in a ―model free‖ 
environment.  In practice, it leads to a highly complex decision-making environment 
where (potentially) a vast array of options can be considered.  For a scholar, the lack an 
obvious economic model for Cuba translates into the need for a better understanding of 
the decision-making process.  If one cannot turn to a set of economic theories in order to 
either explain past actions or predict future economic policy, then an understanding of the 
decision-making process is required in order to better capture the ―logic‖ of economic 
policy.   
 
Given the relationship between the United States and Cuba, it is not surprising that many 
would interpret the absence of a model as verification of the arbitrary rule of Fidel 
Castro.  Economic decision-making, in such circumstances, reflects the preferences and 
prejudices of the tyrant.  State policies reflect the dictator‘s whims. 
 
Rational choice theory offers an alternative perspective.  This method argues that 
decision makers make choices that reflect a preference between outcomes.  Such utility 
maximization offers a degree of flexibility.  As Geddes notes (2000), analysts do not need 
to assume that personal gain (material gain) is the sole objective of decision-makers.  A 
careful study of goals, context, and information can provide a framework for assessing 
decision-making under the rational actor model. 
 
How capricious is economic decision-making in Cuba? Is Fidel Castro a rational actor or 
an erratic tyrant?  In an effort to answer these questions, I apply the rational actor model 
to four economic decisions undertaken by Cuba in the past decade and a half.  These 
policies fall into two critical areas:  currency and foreign investment.  Were the decisions 
announced by Fidel Castro rational?  You decide. 
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Economic Decision-Making in Cuba 
 
The literature on economic decision-making is quite extensive.  Up until the mid-1980s, 
most discussions separated domestic economic decision-making from international 
economic decision-making (see, Keohane and Milner, 1996).   Usually, internal decisions 
were thought of as involving various domestic actors with differing capabilities and 
interests.  Often the state was not portrayed as a participant; rather, different components 
of the state—bureaucracies, governing institutions, etc—were identified as separate 
actors.  In contrast, international economic decision-making envisioned a unitary state 
acting in response to other states and international economic actors.  Over time, this 
―great divide‖ between domestic and foreign decision-making became increasingly 
questioned.  Theories of interdependence (e.g., Keohane and Nye) required analysts to 
examine the interaction between the domestic and international spheres.  The 
development of globalization perspectives further undermined the utility of two 
conceptually distinct modules of decision-making.  Initially, a ―two level game‖ 
conceptualization was developed.   Drawing upon game theory, the ―two level game‖ 
frame of reference envisioned two simultaneous games ―played‖ by policymakers:  one 
internal to the state and the other external to it.  By structuring it as ―two level,‖ this 
image acknowledges that both domestic and foreign decisions must be examined to 
understand state actions.  However, this ―two level‖ game does not really remove the 
―great divide‖ between these two spheres.  It does not provide a means for examining the 
interaction between internal and external concerns and constraints.  Furthermore, a two 
level game implies equality in the decision-making process at both levels.  It is hard to 
assess the relative power and possibly differing role of state in each of the levels.   
 
Clearly, economic decisions are made in an environment with both external and internal 
dimensions.  The first step in assessing this process involves conceptualizing the different 
generic ―inputs‖.  Most simply, one can argue that each ―sphere‖ influences decisions in 
two ways.    First, each sphere has a set of constraints or conditions that set the 
parameters of the decision.  Second, each sphere has a set of objectives or goals 
associated with it.  Rational choice argues that decision-makers select the policy or action 
that will lead (hopefully) to the most desired outcome.  Or, in dire circumstances, 
politicians will choose the path that results in the least objectionable outcome.  The 
incentive structure created by internal and external circumstances--and the relative 
strength of each--shapes the decision taken.  Below is a diagram of this model of 
decision-making. 
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Figure 1:  Economic Decision-Making Tree 
 
 
 
 
Each of the outcomes has an expected utility.  If there are both domestic and international 
outcome, the overall utility reflects the sum of the separate utility of each outcome.  The 
model assumes that decision-makers have a sense of the probability of outcomes as well 
as a preference for outcomes (subjective utility).  The logic of the process suggests that 
decision-makers will select the policy that has the greatest likelihood of a preferred 
outcome.   
 
There are critical assumptions embedded within this model.  First, it assumes that 
decision-makers are able to assess probability of outcomes.  Second, it assumes that 
decision-makers have preferences for different outcomes.  Lastly, it assumes that 
decision-makers are able to make relatively sophisticated calculations that combine 
probability and utility:  that is, a highly desired outcome with a lower probability would 
often NOT be selected if the alternative was a less desired (but not worst) outcome with a 
greater probability.   
 
For some, such assumptions render this model unacceptable.  I would argue that these 
assumptions are not too rigorous, especially in the case of Cuba.  The political survival of 
the Cuban regime in general, and Fidel Castro in particular, suggests a degree of political 
suaveness possible unmatched in contemporary politics.  By looking at the past behavior, 
domestic and international contexts, and public statements, one can tease out probability 
estimates and outcome preferences. 
 
The next step is to create a diagram that reflects the unique combination of influences for 
economic policy decisions.  Clearly, the schema provides the greatest analytical 
assistance when it is modeled for a specific decision.  The constraints imposed by internal 
and external elements, as well as the objectives of the Cuban state and other states differ 
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with time and circumstances.  Some common features can be asserted, though.  In 
general, one may argue that a consistent object of Cuban decision-makers (Fidel Castro in 
particular) has been the maintenance of power (frequently articulated as the survival of 
the Revolution and revolutionary values and principles).  Furthermore, one can also claim 
that the external environment typically imposes a strong constraint/context on economic 
decision-making.  Beyond these generalizations, though, a lot of variation exists 
depending upon the specific economic decision that one seeks to understand.  Clearly, 
though, this model of decision-making suggests that a change in any of the four 
components can lead to a change in economic policy. 
   
 
Case #1 – Legalization of dollars 
 
On August 13, 1993, the Cuban Council of State promulgated Law-Decree 140.  This 
legalized dollar holdings in the country.  In the context of post-1959 Cuba, this was a 
radical economic decision that countered decades-old moral and legal opposition to 
reliance upon and use of US dollars.  Like most Latin American countries, Cuba had 
access to hard currency through remittances and tourism.  Foreign tourism had not been a 
main area of development for revolutionary Cuba.  And, since the early 1960s, the Cuban 
government had identified the Cuban immigrant population in the United States as a 
danger to the country and an anathema to the Revolution.  Thus, as Castro noted: 
 
We--precisely due to our conflicts with the United States 
and conflicts with the worse elements of that emigration, 
those who used to be politicians--had been very strict 
regarding all this matter of transferal of money‖.  (Castro, 
1993)  
 
Thus, when contemplating economic decisions made by the Cuban government over the 
past decades, the legalization of dollar holdings has to stand as one of the most startling 
decisions.  Why did the state make such a drastic departure? 
 
In a speech to economists in 1995, Castro laid out some of the key considerations: 
 
More recently, the abrupt disappearance of the socialist 
bloc and the subsequent loss of the greater part of the 
international economic relations we had been cementing for 
over three decades on fair and worthwhile grounds have 
forced us to face an extremely difficult, complex economic 
crisis. To this, add the effect of the restrengthening of the 
blockade, as cruel for the damage it causes our country, as 
it is useless in its ultimate goal of overpowering the 
fatherland.  In the economic sector, we have been able to 
introduce the necessary changes in our methods and 
operational mechanisms, always acting with flexibility and 
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Figure 2:  Factors Surrounding the Legalization of Dollar Decision (1993) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
An additional element was noted in the speech when Castro introduced the idea of 
legalization of dollar holdings:  the critical need for foreign exchange. 
 
We must purchase oil, food, medicine, raw material, and 
spare parts with foreign exchange. We must purchase 
everything with foreign exchange. … This is why we must 
increase our income in convertible foreign exchange. It is 
vitally important for the country. (Castro, 1993) 
 
The pressing need for foreign exchange, though, had to be balanced by the political goal 
of ―preserving and defending the true interests of [the Cuban] people, interests‖ which in 
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the eyes of the leadership ―were not met in the past and will not be met in the future in a 
society where the prevailing values are those of the capitalist system‖. (Castro 1993) 
 
The fall of the Berlin Wall, the end of communism in Eastern Europe, and the 
disappearance of the Soviet Union all signaled the end of the Cold War.  However, the 
United States did not alter its policy toward Cuba.  Rather, the US saw this as an 
opportunity to hasten the end of the Cuban regime.  The Cuban Democracy Act (also 
known as the Torricelli Act) prohibited foreign-based subsidiaries of US companies from 
trading with Cuba, as well as travel to Cuba by U.S. citizens, and family remittances to 
Cuba.  At this time, 70% of Cuban trade with US subsidiaries was in the realm of food 
and medicine.  According to the sponsoring Congressman, the Act was intended to 
"wreak havoc on the island." (Congressional Record).   
 
Thus, beginning in 1989 (when Gorbachev informs Cuba that the terms of trade between 
the two states will change), all of the factors that influence economic decision making 
began to change.  They can be summarized as:   
 
Global Conditions/Constraints = demise of socialist bloc, especially the CMEA, the 
trading group to which Cuba belonged; tightening of the embargo by the US, with the 
passage of the Democracy in Cuba Act (known as Torricelli Act)  
 
Internal Conditions/Constraints = food shortages; fuel shortages; ―primary product‖-input 
shortages; medical shortages; etc 
 
Internal goals/objectives = survival of regime/Revolution:  ―We must keep in mind that 
the best economic decisions will always be those strengthening national independence 
and the role of our nation in the concert of nations, the guiding principles of our society, 
and most importantly, the heroic and decisive struggle against the criminal imperialist 
blockade‖ (Castro, 1995a)  
 
External goals/objectives:  disinterest on the part of Russia and China; commitment of 
ending the regime on the part of the US. By strengthening the embargo; Torricelli Act 
seen as a way to bring down Castro "within weeks." 
 
All of these elements interact with each other.  Clearly, the global economic conditions 
and constraints impact upon the Cuban domestic economy.  These lead to increased 
pressure upon the state to maintain its political objectives.  The graph below illustrates 
the deterioration of the Cuban economic situation, with its attendant political stress. 
 - 7 - 
Figure 3:  Percentage Change in Cuban GDP, 1988-1998 
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In this context, the legalization of dollar holdings appears to be a logical response to all 
of the elements coming to bear—and intensifying—on the Cuban economy.  
 
 
Figure 4:  Decision-making Tree for Dollar Legalization 
 
 
 
In general, we can assume that O11 and O21 had (at a minimum) equal utilities.  
Furthermore, we can assert that the Cuban leaders would prefer either O11 or O21 to O12 
or O22.  Therefore, the probability (P1 or P2) would determine whether or not to select A1 
or A2.  And, the evidence from public speeches suggests that P1 was considered greater 
than P2. 
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Case #2 – Opening up to direct foreign investment 
 
The transformation of Cuban policy on direct foreign investment also generated much 
attention.  While foreign investment in Cuba existed prior to the 1990s, it was neither 
very extensive nor very encouraged.  The move to alter law in order to promote foreign 
investment was, thus, notable.   In Castro‘s own words:  ―Who would have thought that 
we, so doctrinaire, we who fought foreign investment, would one day view foreign 
investment as an urgent need?‖  (Castro, 1993) 
 
The decision-making context was the same as that regarding legalization of dollar 
holdings.  The economic role played by the Soviet Union and other socialist states had 
not been replaced by other countries.  From Cuba‘s perspective: 
 
We received factories, loans, and many other things from 
the socialist bloc, but it has disappeared and we are getting 
nothing.  We are getting nothing from the non-existent 
USSR and socialist bloc or from any international financial 
institution, which are all dominated by the United States. 
(Castro, 1993) 
 
As time passed, the situation did not improve.  No countries stepped in to provide 
preferential trade arrangements along the lines of the CMEA.  The United States was 
continuing to pressure Cuba; The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act (typically 
referred to as Helms-Burton), which passed the Congress in 1995, joined the Torricelli 
Act in burdening on Cuba.  From Castro‘s perspective, ―the enemy does not falter in its 
determination to destroy [Cuba].‖  (Castro, 1995b) 
 
After working on drafts and debating elements, the National Assembly passed Decree-
Law No. 77 on foreign investment.  The law codifies the property rights of foreign 
investments, including tax rates, regulation on payrolls, restrictions on ownership (up to 
100% foreign ownership allowed).  When presenting the Decree-Law to the Assembly, 
Ricardo Alarcon (President of the Assembly) prefaced its introduction with an 
explanation:   
 
in today's world, without the existence of the Socialist bloc, 
with a globalizing world economy and strong hegemonistic 
tendencies in the economic, political and military fields, 
Cuba, in order to preserve its accomplishments despite the 
fierce blockade to which it is subjected; lacking capital, 
certain kinds of technology and often markets, and in need 
of restructuring its industry, can benefit from foreign 
investment, on the basis of the strictest respect for national 
independence and sovereignty, given that such investment 
can usher in the introduction of innovative and advanced 
technology, the modernization of its industries, greater 
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efficiency in production, the creation of new jobs, 
improvement in the quality of the products and services it 
offers, cost reduction, greater competitiveness abroad, and 
access to certain markets, which as a whole would boost 
the efforts the country must undertake in its economic and 
social development. (Alarcon, 1995 – emphasis added) 
 
Taking apart the statement, one can see all of the components identified in the schema 
addressed.  To summarize: 
 
Global Conditions/Constraints = demise of socialist bloc; emergence of globalization as 
an economic force; tightening of the embargo by the US, with Torricelli Act and Helms-
Burton 
 
Internal Conditions/Constraints = continuing struggle to meet needs of the population 
 
Internal goals/objectives = survival of regime/Revolution: with emphasis on 
independence and sovereignty of Cuba. 
 
External goals/objectives:  US hegemony, coupled with continuing desire of the US to 
end the regime. 
 
Figure 5 presents these aspects visually. 
Figure 5:  Expansion of Direct Foreign Investment Decision (1995) 
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The desire for foreign investment was not new.  The extent of changes undertaken to 
attract it was, however.  The commitment to 100% foreign ownership, as well as 
investment from Cubans no longer on the island, was clearly a departure.  Assessing the 
scope of pressures upon the Cuban system helps to illuminate why the regime chose to 
pursue these policies.  Thus, the decision-making can be modeled accordingly. 
 
Figure 6:  Decision-Making Tree for Direct Foreign Investment 
 
 
 
In general, we can assume that O11 and O21 had similar utilities.  Perhaps some might 
argue that O21 had a greater utility because it maintained ‗revolutionary purity‖ (or 
maximum state control).  It is likely that O12 and O22 would be less preferred.  We may 
infer that decision-makers would prefer either O11 or O21 to O12 or O22.  Therefore, the 
deciding factor for whether or not to select A1 or A2.would be the relative probability 
associated with each outcome (P1 or P2).  Again, evidence from public utterances 
suggests that P1 was considered greater than P2. 
 
 
Case #3 – Restructuring the Sugar Industry Decision 
 
After the end of the Soviet Union, many predicted the imminent collapse of the Cuban 
regime.  As Cuba struggled through the 1990s, the survival of the government emerged as 
a possibility.  The (relative) rebounding of the economy did not signify an end to major 
economic changes, though.  On April 10, 2002, the Cuban government announced that 
about half of Cuba's 156 sugar mills would be closed permanently as part of a 
restructuring process.  Given the place sugar has had in the Cuban economy for almost 
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200 years, this was a major transformation in Cuban economic policy.  What prompted 
such a drastic move?   
 
In comparison to the early 1990s, the external and internal economic conditions were not 
as dire.   The economy had stopped contracting, although the percentage growth varied 
from year to year (see Figure 5).   
 
Figure 7:  Percentage Change in Cuban GDP, 1993-2001 
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The halting improvement in GDP growth was matched by continuing direct foreign 
investment in the country.  Major investors came from Canada, Spain, and Mexico.  As 
Cuba entered the new century, China and Venezuela emerged as major trading partners.  
In the past, Cuba tended to shift into a position with a single, dominant trading partner 
(first the United States; later, the Soviet Union).  Now, Cuba was wary of relying too 
much on any one country.   
 
We went to bed one night and when we woke up, the 
Soviet Union was not there anymore and we had to begin 
all over again.  The same thing had occurred years before 
with the United States.  This is not going to happen again to 
us (quoted in Jatar-Hausmann, 1999) 
 
The improved internal and external economic environment was general in nature.  In the 
specific realm of sugar, the situation was bleak.  The reasons for a drastic policy change 
in the sugar industry included depressed world prices, a poor outlook for the world sugar 
market, and Cuba's excess capacity.  Overall, Cuba could produce more than the market 
could absorb but with lower productivity levels than other producers.  Yet the sugar 
industry was central to the Cuban economy.  Cuba's raw sugar mills are located in 100 of 
its 169 municipalities.  And, nearly a half of a million jobs were associated with the 
Cuban sugar industry, responsible for 1 in 5 jobs in the country.   
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Under such conditions, the economic decision to change the sugar was significant.  The 
state argued that the restructuring had three general objectives: achieve efficiency and 
competitiveness in sugarcane and sugar production; increase food production through 
agricultural and industrial diversification; and, develop a sustainable agriculture, 
supported by knowledge and human capital.  In essence, by devoting less land and less 
labor to sugar (closing mills and transferring crops to ―sugar lands‖) while improving 
productivity--through more technology and capital--Cuba could further strengthen its 
economy.  In many ways, this harkened back to the early years of the Revolution, when 
Cuba sought to develop through diversification away from sugar production. 
 
A few statistics reveal that the Cuban government faced problems with sugar production. 
 
 
Figure 7b:  Market Price for Sugar – 1989-2003 
 
 
Source:  Cutting Losses:  Cuba Downsizes Its Sugar Industry 
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Figure 8:  Comparative Levels of Sugar Production & Export 
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Figure 9:  Comparative Sugar Productivity, 2002 
 
Source:  Cutting Losses:  Cuba Downsizes Its Sugar Industry 
Falling prices, declining market share, and low productivity all create global economic 
constraints in the area of sugar.  And, as Castro noted in an address to sugar workers 
beginning their retraining, additional factors influenced the decision: 
 
in 1959-1960, after the triumph of the Revolution, with one 
ton of sugar, at world market prices, it was possible to buy 
eight tons of oil.  Today, at current oil prices, which have 
been hovering around 30-something, it takes two tons of 
sugar to buy one ton of oil.  But back then, in addition, the 
sugar industry barely consumed any oil. The development 
of the Revolution led to the need for the mechanization of 
the sector. Those who lived off of cane cutting completely 
disappeared; and tens of thousands of people from the cities 
had to be mobilized to cut the sugar cane, until the 
machines appeared and the harvest could be mechanized. 
….Then came the equipment. Machines and trucks 
compacted the soil, and then came subsoiling. Chemical 
products were used to eliminate weeds, but were very 
costly. Fertilizers were used to maintain the production 
capacity of the land. Today, producing a ton of sugar at 
current oil prices raises the cost in hard currency of that ton 
of sugar by at least 40%. (Castro, 2002) 
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So, the irrationality of continuing was clear.  At the same time, conditions existed to 
restructure with greater efficiency and effect.  Sugar was open to direct foreign 
investment (with an eye to developing greater productivity).  And, displaced sugar 
workers were offered retraining: 
 
The Ministry of Education will provide 1617 teachers. 
There is no need for any new buildings, because the classes 
begin at 5:00 p.m., when all the high school students have 
finished for the day. And at all these sugar mills, like 
everywhere else in the country, there are high schools with 
computer labs and audiovisual equipment. One of the first 
things that can be studied, with a certain prior level of 
education, is computer science, and this will not cost a 
penny, except perhaps in certain cases where more 
computers will be needed. There is no need for any new 
buildings. All the audiovisual equipment is available, with 
no need for extra expenditures. The teachers are available 
with no need to increase the education budget.  (Castro, 
2002) 
 
Figure 10:  Restructuring the Sugar Industry (2002) 
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Thus, with a minimum expenditure, the state would undertake to transform sugar workers 
into more educated and better-trained workers.  Investing in human capital, Cuba would 
alter its industrial profile to become more productive (and lucrative).  Displaced workers 
would have opportunities (if appropriately trained) to enter into the newer trading area:  
service workers.  By 2002, Cuba had already begun to send doctors and teachers to 
Venezuela and Brazil in return for imports.  Despite the major dislocation of a critical 
industry, a sense of promise was clear in Castro‘s speech: 
 
It is difficult to withstand 43 years of a blockade and to 
have done what has been done in 10 years of the special 
period. The time is coming to reap the fruits.  For the 
moment, when the special period arrived for all the rest, 
and some proclaimed that the end had come for the ideas of 
socialism, here they will find a country that is prospering, 
advancing, doing things that countries living under the 
capitalist system could never even dream of doing. Yes, the 
feat we have achieved is becoming a unique case in all 
history.  (Castro, 2002) 
 
Thus, the situation surrounding the decision to restructure can be summarized as follows: 
 
Global Conditions/Constraints = increased competition; low world prices for sugar; 
excess capacity and production; growing use of substitute (fructose); relative price of 
sugar to oil poor. 
 
Internal Conditions/Constraints = poor productivity compared to other producers; highly 
mechanized and heavy use of inputs for production; need for inputs in other areas; 
inability to subsidy industry; use for workers in other areas. 
 
Internal goals/objectives = Revolutionary goals of development with emphasis on 
independence and sovereignty of Cuba; regime survival (uncontrolled collapse of sugar 
industry could be devastating). 
 
External goals/objectives:  growing ties to Brazil and Venezuela; continuing interest of 
the US in ending the regime, but preoccupation with other matters. 
 
While restructuring the sugar industry was profound, it was not done in the same context 
of crisis as earlier decisions examined above.  Both unfavorable and favorable conditions 
existed.  It might be argued that the characteristics of the sugar industry had been poor 
since 1990.  Perhaps the restructuring decision was determined by the rise of favorable 
internal and external attributes which made planned downsizing possible. 
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Figure 11:  Decision-Making Tree for Sugar Industry Restructuring 
 
 
  
 
In this scenario, we can assume that O11 had a greater utility than O21 because it led to a 
better economic outcome.  Compared to either O11 or O21, though, it is likely that O12 and 
O22 would be less preferred.  Therefore, the deciding factor for whether or not to select 
A1 or A2 would be the relative utility associated with O11 and O21 coupled with the 
probability of each outcome (P1 or P2).  Given that O11 has a greater utility, if P1 were 
either equal to or greater than P2, A1 would be the choice.  Public statements suggest that 
P1 was considered greater than P2 by Cuban officials. 
 
 
Case #4 – De-Dollarization Decision 
 
In a televised announcement on October 25, 2004, Fidel Castro announced substantial 
changes to the role played by the US dollar in the Cuban economy.  The new regulations 
did not signify that Cuba was abandoning its dual economy where some transactions 
occur in Cuban pesos, others in convertible foreign currency. Nor were criminal penalties 
for possession of foreign currency being reinstated.  However, use of dollars by ―all 
entities‖ in Cuba would shift to convertible pesos.  In addition, a surcharge of 10% would 
be levied on exchanges from dollars to pesos after November 8
th
.  The new measure did 
not affect dollar-denominated bank accounts; however, no new dollars could be deposited 
after November 8
th
.  The new regulations did allow the deposit of Euros or other 
convertible currencies.  Likewise, Euros and other currencies did not face a future 10% 
surcharge on exchanges. 
 
Probability = P1 
 
Probability = P2 
 
Probability = (1-P2) 
 
Probability = (1-P1) 
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From 1993--after the decriminalization of dollar holdings--until autumn 2004, dollars had 
grown ever more pervasive in Cuba.  It was a currency utilized not just by tourists; 
Cubans would spend dollars in ―dollar stores‖ which sold consumer items only available 
for purchase in those stores.  Cuban industries would pay other Cuban firms for materiel 
in dollars. (Scherlen, 2004)  
 
Yet while the presence of dollars was everywhere, not everyone had access to dollars.  
And this translated into growing inequality.  One economist summarized the situation 
clearly: 
 
The coexistence of peso and dollar currencies and 
economies in Cuba, together with the dual exchange rate 
system, generate a variety of problems. The basic reason 
for this is that the average wage and income are somewhere 
between US $9 and US $17 per month at the quasi-official 
exchange rate. (The average wage in Cuba was estimated at 
232 pesos and the average income from all sources at 359 
pesos in 2000 [CEEC 2001, 8].) This means that those 
Cubans with access to U.S. dollars from remittances, 
foreign travel, or tips and gratuities from tourism, for 
example, generally have higher real incomes than those 
without such access. Moreover, as noted earlier, ever-
increasing proportions of goods and services are available 
for dollars in dollar stores and not for pesos. The result is 
that everyone has been chasing dollars since the early 
1990s. In other words, there has been a strong incentive for 
people to leave or reduce those economic activities that 
earn pesos and enter or expand those that earn dollars.  The 
result is that the general structure of material rewards in 
Cuban society bears little relationship to the true social 
value of the employment generating the incomes. (Ritter, 
205:  16-17) 
 
Thus, the use of dollars challenged a fundamental tenet of the Revolution and a source of 
pride (equality) for the regime. 
 
Actions on the part of the United States increased pressure upon Cuba.  In October 2003, 
President Bush established to Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba.  Secretary of 
State Colin Powell was named its chair.  Its mandate focused on five different areas: 
bringing about a peaceful, near-term end to the dictatorship; establishing democratic 
institutions, respect for human rights, and the rule of law; creating the core institutions of 
a free economy; modernizing infrastructure; and meeting basic needs in the areas of 
health, education, housing, and human services (Mission and Members of the 
Commission).  When announcing the Commission, President Bush stated that  
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Clearly, the Castro regime will not change by its own 
choice. But Cuba must change. So today I'm announcing 
several new initiatives intended to hasten the arrival of a 
new, free, democratic Cuba. (Bush, October 10, 2003) 
 
When the Commission delivered its report, the President accepted its recommendations 
fully.  In keeping with its mission, there were several difference aspects to the 
Commission‘s plan of action. 
 
In order to hasten the fall of the Castro regime, the Commission called for several 
different new regulations.  A number of them dealt with the Cuban-American 
community.  Those wishes to travel to Cuba for family visits have to apply for specific 
licenses.  They may only visit Cuba once every three years.  New arrivals from Cuba 
must wait three year to visit.  Authorized per diem has been decreased from $164 to $50 
per day.  Family visits are only permitted to see immediate family, which is stipulated as 
―grandparents, grandchildren, parents, siblings, spouses, and children‖ (Report to the 
President: Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba – henceforth Commission).  
Regulations concerning remittances were also revised.  In keeping with the travel 
restrictions, remittances are allowed only for permitted family members, none of whom 
can be Cuban Communist Party members or Cuban government officials.  Cuban-
Americans are still permitted to send $300 per quarter to those who are qualified to 
receive the money.  The Commission also recommended greater emphasis on law 
enforcement and ―sting operations against ‗mule‘ networks and others who illegally carry 
money‖ (Commission). 
 
The Commission also recommended actions aimed at people within Cuba.  The President 
is authorizing ―up to $36 million to carry out democracy-building activities, support for 
the family members of the political opposition, and to support efforts to help youth, 
women, and Afro-Cubans take their rightful place in the pro-democracy movement.‖  
Furthermore, the Commission proposed ―up to $18 million for regular airborne 
broadcasts to Cuba and the purchase of a dedicated airborne platform for the transmission 
of Radio and Television Mart into Cuba.‖   And, the Commission also suggested that the 
US government spend ―$5 million for public diplomacy efforts to disseminate 
information abroad about U.S. foreign policy, including Castro's record of abusing 
human rights, harboring terrorists, committing espionage against other countries, 
fomenting subversion of democratically-elected governments in Latin America, and other 
actions which pose a threat to United States national interests.‖ (Commission) 
 
Some components of the new regulations focused exclusively on the Cuban government.  
For instance, the Commission called for the US government to ―neutralize Cuban 
government front companies by establishing a Cuban Asset Targeting Group made up of 
law enforcement authorities to investigate and identify new ways hard currency moves in 
and out of Cuba.‖ The Commission‘s recommendations include targeting ―regime 
officials for visa denial if they (1) are or were involved in torture or other serious human 
rights abuses or (2) provided assistance to fugitives from U.S. justice‖ (Commission).  In 
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practice, the US government has been broadly refusing visa requests for any Cubans that 
work for the state, including academics who had traditionally traveled to the US for 
scholarly purposes. 
 
All of the above measures are seen as mechanisms for quickening the demise of the 
Castro regime.  In concert with these recommendations, the U.S. levied a fine against the 
Swiss bank UBS for violating its agreement with the Federal Reserve by supplying Cuba 
with fresh U.S. currency.  This complies with a Bush Administration promise, made 
October 9, 2004  to a Miami audience, to ―investigate and identify new ways hard 
currency moves in and out of Cuba, and to stop it.‖   
 
Under such circumstances, the government sought for ways to reduce Cuba‘s 
vulnerability to these pressures.  De-dollarization of the Cuban economy was clearly an 
option (Lexington Institute).  While some greeted the news as ―a sign of distress‖ 
(Bussey, Miami Herald), others might argue that it was adopted from a (relative) position 
of strength.  Several favorable factors played into the decision-making process.  The need 
for hard currency to pay for rising oil prices lessened because of agreements with 
Venezuela. (Monreal, 2006)   A number of trade agreements with China also 
strengthened the economy.  Underlying economic and political problems with the heavy 
use of dollars in Cuba had been in existence for years (since 1993).  Pressure by the 
United States on dollars offered a political scapegoat; the pain caused by de-dollarization 
could be blamed on the Bush Administration.  And, the economic costs of (potentially) 
declining dollar inflows could be offset by decreased outflows of hard currency for oil 
purchases. 
 
All of the following conditioned the de-dollarization choice: 
 
Global Conditions/Constraints = rising oil costs; increased trade with China, Venezuela, 
and Brazil; US pressure on foreign banks; charges of money laundering. 
 
Internal Conditions/Constraints = economic growth; recovering tourism; inequality due to 
unequal access to foreign currency 
 
Internal goals/objectives = Revolutionary goals of development with emphasis on 
independence and sovereignty of Cuba; revolutionary concerns about equity. 
 
External goals/objectives:  growing ties to China and Venezuela; upsurge in US activity 
to place pressure upon the regime 
 - 21 - 
Economic 
growth; 
growing 
inequality 
Chinese & 
Venezuelan 
support; 
renewed US 
opposition 
Save to 
regime; 
maintain 
aspects of 
Revolution 
Rising fuel costs; 
strong growth in 
China & Venezuela 
Economic 
Decision – 
restrict use of 
dollars 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12:  De-Dollarization Decision (2004) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Overall, de-dollarization was a potentially risky option for the state.  High oil prices can 
cause considerable balance-of-payments difficulties and remittances (typically in dollars) 
continue to play a large role in Cuba‘s economic health.  Only a fraction of the 
population has regular access to dollars, thus the impact would probably not be too 
widespread (especially in contrast with decisions regarding the sugar industry).  The 
decision looks like a gamble based on an optimistic assessment of Cuba‘s economy. 
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Figure 13:  Decision-Making Tree for De-Dollarization 
 
 
In this scenario, we can assume that O11 had a greater utility than O21 because it led to a 
better political outcome-less political vulnerability to the US and less economic 
inequality within Cuba.  It is likely that O12 and O22 would be less preferred to either O11 
or O21.  Therefore, the deciding factor for whether or not to select A1 or A2 would be the 
relative utility associated with O11 and O21 coupled with the probability of each outcome 
(P1 or P2).  Given that O11 has a greater utility, if P1 were either equal to or greater than 
P2, A1 would be the choice.  Statements by Castro and others indicate that P1 was 
considered greater than P2 by Cuban officials. 
 
 
 
Conclusion:  Implications of the Decision-Making Schema 
 
So what does this exercise in retroactive policy analysis gain us?  My quest was to gain 
some frame of reference for understanding economic decisions in Cuba in the absence of 
an over all economic model.  In this way, Cuba is unlike the former Soviet Union and 
Eastern Europe and more akin to China and Vietnam.  In Russia and its former satellites, 
central planning and state socialism (as opposed to democratic socialism) have been 
openly discarded.  Market principles and a commitment to capitalism underlie their 
economic choices.  Of course, within that broad ―model‖ there is tremendous room for 
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variation.  However, it does provide a set of parameters within which economic decisions 
are made. 
 
Cuba has not rejected socialism.  Indeed, the refrain ―socialismo o muerte‖ (socialism or 
death) continues to echo across the island—by officials.  There is clearly continuing 
resistance of ―neo-liberal‖ globalization (see, for instance, Capitalism in Crisis by Fidel 
Castro).  This position embraces aspects of globalization, while calling for change as 
well: 
 
Globalization is an irreversible reality characterized by the 
growing interaction of all countries in the world, their 
economies and peoples. The major scientific and technical 
advances have shortened distances and allowed for direct 
communication and transmission of information among 
countries located anywhere on the planet.  With its 
impressive technological achievements, globalization holds 
tremendous potential for development, the eradication of 
poverty and fostering well being in conditions of social 
equality for all humanity. Never before had the world 
commanded today‘s formidable technological resources.  
However, the world is still very far from materializing the 
potentials of globalization. It develops today under the 
aegis of neoliberal policies that impose unregulated 
markets and unbridled privatization.  Far from promoting 
the expansion of development throughout an increasingly 
interdependent world badly in need of sharing the 
progresses achieved, neoliberal globalization has 
aggravated existing inequalities and raised to inordinate 
heights social inequities and the most irritating contrasts 
between extreme wealth and extreme poverty. (Castro, 
1999) 
 
So, how does Cuba make economic decisions when it neither wholly rejects globalization 
nor entirely adopts orthodox socialism?  The parameters that bound economic decisions 
are much wider.  Such circumstances, I would argue, allows for greater weight to be 
placed on the conditions and circumstances that shape Cuban economics and politics. 
 
At present, Cuba is reaping the benefits of challenges to ―Washington Consensus‖ in 
Latin America and the rest of the world.  Its connections to Venezuela and Bolivia have 
revived its foreign policy role in Latin America.  There have also been economic gains 
(see Monreal, 2006).  Global politics and economics are also assisting Cuba.  Both China 
and Cuba see advantage to increasing ties.   When looking at the ―global‖ components 
that shape economic decision-making, at present Cuba is experiencing a more positive 
environment. 
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This assessment of the incentive structure and decision-making tree has implications for 
predictions about post-Castro Cuba.  It is clear that benefits have been derived from 
fulfilling some aspect of the Revolution:  as one author noted, it is possible that ―the 
secret of Fidel Castro‘s endurance comes down to standard-issue eyeglasses‖ available to 
all Cubans (Chavez, 2005:  1).  A willingness to balance revolutionary goals with 
economic realities has been a hallmark of post-USSR Cuba.  This tendency is likely to 
remain even after Castro leaves power.  For instance, there are frequent reports about the 
―economic pragmatism‖ of Raul Castro and his tolerance for ―economic reform.‖  (see, 
for example, Erikson, 2005:  95)  
 
The schema falls short in giving us insight into more detailed analysis of economic 
decision-making.  Its predictive capability is low.  How does Cuba choose from among 
the variety of options available?  How can we explain the scope and pace of the sugar 
industry restructuring?  Works by Corrales (2004) and Rosenberg (1992) offer 
explanations about the internal politics of Cuba that shape the choices made within the 
context I have discussed above.  Delving further into this ―black box‖—the selection 
process between various options, such as the pace and scope of specific economic 
policy—is crucial.  
 
Overall, though, this paper sought a more modest objective.  Without strong theoretical 
heuristics, how can we assess economic policy in Cuba?  I reject relying on a single 
variable – Fidel Castro‘s personal whim—as the explanation for all decisions on the 
island.  I believe that the schema developed and demonstrated above helps to elucidate 
the various factors that shape Cuban economic decision-making.   
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